Be A Freedom Fighter · Bill Library

HR 10832 — IRAN Act

Freedom score: 0 (scale −10 to +10)

Sponsor: Rep. Tenney, Claudia [R-NY-24] · Latest action: Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. (2026-10-15)

Full text on GovInfo (introduced version) · Congress.gov · ← Bill Library index

Findings — 15 highlighted provisions

Each item below is one provision documented in the findings file. The same provision is highlighted in the full text underneath, with its section citation and criterion. Everything else on this page is plain, unreviewed bill text.

  1. Sec. 3(a)(1)(C), proposed Iran Threat Reduction Act § 414(a)(11) · Individual Rights — Requires evaluation of VPNs, decentralized and peer-to-peer networks, direct-to-cell satellite systems, and other circumvention tools for Iranian civil society and human-rights activists. Affected: Federal strategists and intended beneficiaries abroad. Enforcement: Federal strategy/review duties, not penalties against private users See in text ↓
  2. Proposed § 414(a)(12)–(13) · Individual Rights — Requires federal coordination to facilitate lawful provision of open-internet technologies and a strategy for circumventing Iranian internet blackouts. Enforcement: Interagency planning and reporting See in text ↓
  3. Sec. 5(a)(1)–(3) · Individual Rights — Requires State to seek cybersecurity training, secure communication tools, and multilingual educational materials for journalists, human-rights defenders, and civil society actors in Iran. Affected: Intended overseas beneficiaries and federal administrators. Enforcement: Federal program and reporting duties, not new obligations on Iranian citizens See in text ↓
  4. Proposed § 414(a)(12) · Economic Freedom — Directs coordination with Treasury and Commerce to enable companies to provide lawful internet-access tools to Iranian civilians, expressly subject to existing sanctions and export controls. Affected: Agencies and interested technology providers. Enforcement: Existing restrictions continue to apply See in text ↓
  5. Sec. 4(a)(1)–(2) · Economic Freedom — Requires the FCC, when considering new or modified direct-to-cell or satellite licenses and market-access grants, to consider encouraging licensees not to intentionally disable, degrade, or geoblock Iran coverage, subject to legal, interference, and network-security exceptions. Affected: FCC and satellite operators. Enforcement: Licensing consideration; the bill does not expressly impose an unconditional coverage mandate See in text ↓
  6. Sec. 6(a)–(b) · Economic Freedom — Authorizes $15 million annually for FY2027 and FY2028 for the Secs. 4–5 activities, with appropriated amounts authorized to remain available until expended. Enforcement: Federal appropriations/program administration; an authorization is not an appropriation See in text ↓
  7. Sec. 5(a)(2)–(3) · Privacy and Due Process — Directs attention to tools that minimize detection risks, including VPNs and end-to-end encrypted messaging. No compulsory personal surveillance or reporting is created See in text ↓
  8. Sec. 3(a)(1) · Government Power — Amends the existing Iran internet-freedom strategy to include circumvention technology, commercial access, and blackout resilience See in text ↓
  9. Sec. 3(a)(1)(D), proposed § 414(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires regular interagency strategy review and submission of updated strategies to Congress, including implementation progress and coordination assessments See in text ↓
  10. Sec. 3(a)(2)(A)–(C) · Government Power — Requires the first updated strategy within 120 days after enactment, in unclassified form with an optional classified annex; states that subsequent updates should occur at least annually See in text ↓
  11. Sec. 4(a) · Government Power — Adds an FCC licensing consideration, subject to specified exceptions See in text ↓
  12. Sec. 4(b) · Government Power — Expresses a nonbinding congressional view about U.S. advocacy at international telecommunications bodies See in text ↓
  13. Sec. 4(c)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires a State Department briefing within 180 days and annually for five years on relevant international advocacy and known satellite-coverage exclusions See in text ↓
  14. Sec. 5(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires effectiveness assessments and a GAO evaluation within three years See in text ↓
  15. Sec. 7(1)–(3) · Government Power — Defines the appropriate congressional committees, direct-to-cell communications, and relevant satellite communications See in text ↓

Full text (introduced version)

30 of 44 text blocks highlighted. Source: GovInfo, fetched cached.

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] [H.R. 10832 Introduced in House (IH)] <DOC> 119th CONGRESS 2d Session H. R. 10832 To amend the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 to make certain improvements relating to the coordination of efforts to promote internet freedom and access to information in Iran, and for other purposes. _______________________________________________________________________ IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES October 15, 2026 Ms. Tenney (for herself, Ms. Ansari, Ms. Foxx, Mr. Min, Mr. Lawler, Mr. Schneider, Mr. Fitzpatrick, Mr. Auchincloss, Ms. Salazar, Mr. Gottheimer, Mrs. Bice, Mr. Walkinshaw, Ms. Malliotakis, Ms. Omar, and Mr. Carson) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned _______________________________________________________________________ A BILL To amend the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 to make certain improvements relating to the coordination of efforts to promote internet freedom and access to information in Iran, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Internet Reach and Access Now Act'' or the ``IRAN Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.

(a) Findings.--Congress finds the followings:
(1) The Government of Iran has repeatedly disrupted, throttled, or shut down internet connectivity, impeding the ability of the Iranian people to communicate during emergencies and to exercise internationally recognized human rights.
(2) Satellite-based residential and direct-to-cell (DTC) communications, virtual private networks services (VPN services), embedded-SIM (eSIM) technology, and other circumvention tools can mitigate those shutdowns, but Iranian users face high costs, sanctions-related equipment barriers, and pervasive digital surveillance.
(3) Clarifying United States policy and supporting secure connectivity tools will materially enhance internet resilience for the people of Iran.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that United States policy should--
(1) promote the deployment of DTC communications, VPN services, eSIM technology, and other secure communications tools that enhance open access to the internet in Iran; and
(2) ensure that sanctions and export-control regulations are implemented in a manner that does not unintentionally hinder access to such tools by the Iranian people.

SEC. 3. IMPROVED COORDINATION OF EFFORTS TO PROMOTE INTERNET FREEDOM IN IRAN.

Sec. 3(a)(1)(C), proposed Iran Threat Reduction Act § 414(a)(11) · Individual Rights — Requires evaluation of VPNs, decentralized and peer-to-peer networks, direct-to-cell satellite systems, and other circumvention tools for Iranian civil society and human-rights activists. Affected: Federal strategists and intended beneficiaries abroad. Enforcement: Federal strategy/review duties, not penalties against private users

Sec. 3(a)(1) · Government Power — Amends the existing Iran internet-freedom strategy to include circumvention technology, commercial access, and blackout resilience

Sec. 3(a)(1)(D), proposed § 414(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires regular interagency strategy review and submission of updated strategies to Congress, including implementation progress and coordination assessments

Sec. 3(a)(2)(A)–(C) · Government Power — Requires the first updated strategy within 120 days after enactment, in unclassified form with an optional classified annex; states that subsequent updates should occur at least annually

(a) Modifications and Updates to Comprehensive Strategy To Promote Internet Freedom and Access to Information in Iran.--

Sec. 3(a)(1)(C), proposed Iran Threat Reduction Act § 414(a)(11) · Individual Rights — Requires evaluation of VPNs, decentralized and peer-to-peer networks, direct-to-cell satellite systems, and other circumvention tools for Iranian civil society and human-rights activists. Affected: Federal strategists and intended beneficiaries abroad. Enforcement: Federal strategy/review duties, not penalties against private users

Sec. 3(a)(1) · Government Power — Amends the existing Iran internet-freedom strategy to include circumvention technology, commercial access, and blackout resilience

Sec. 3(a)(1)(D), proposed § 414(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires regular interagency strategy review and submission of updated strategies to Congress, including implementation progress and coordination assessments

(1) Modifications.--Section 414 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8754) is amended-- (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``Not later than'' and inserting ``

Sec. 3(a)(1)(C), proposed Iran Threat Reduction Act § 414(a)(11) · Individual Rights — Requires evaluation of VPNs, decentralized and peer-to-peer networks, direct-to-cell satellite systems, and other circumvention tools for Iranian civil society and human-rights activists. Affected: Federal strategists and intended beneficiaries abroad. Enforcement: Federal strategy/review duties, not penalties against private users

Proposed § 414(a)(12)–(13) · Individual Rights — Requires federal coordination to facilitate lawful provision of open-internet technologies and a strategy for circumventing Iranian internet blackouts. Enforcement: Interagency planning and reporting

Proposed § 414(a)(12) · Economic Freedom — Directs coordination with Treasury and Commerce to enable companies to provide lawful internet-access tools to Iranian civilians, expressly subject to existing sanctions and export controls. Affected: Agencies and interested technology providers. Enforcement: Existing restrictions continue to apply

``(a) Comprehensive Strategy.--Not later than--''; (B) by redesignating paragraphs (11) and (12) as paragraphs (14) and (15), respectively; (C) by inserting after paragraph (10) the following new paragraphs:

Sec. 3(a)(1)(C), proposed Iran Threat Reduction Act § 414(a)(11) · Individual Rights — Requires evaluation of VPNs, decentralized and peer-to-peer networks, direct-to-cell satellite systems, and other circumvention tools for Iranian civil society and human-rights activists. Affected: Federal strategists and intended beneficiaries abroad. Enforcement: Federal strategy/review duties, not penalties against private users

``(11) evaluate the use of virtual private networks, decentralized networks, peer-to-peer technologies, direct-to- cell satellite technologies, and other emerging circumvention tools by civil society and human rights activists in Iran and develop strategies for increasing access to and the availability of such networks and technologies found to be effective;

Proposed § 414(a)(12)–(13) · Individual Rights — Requires federal coordination to facilitate lawful provision of open-internet technologies and a strategy for circumventing Iranian internet blackouts. Enforcement: Interagency planning and reporting

Proposed § 414(a)(12) · Economic Freedom — Directs coordination with Treasury and Commerce to enable companies to provide lawful internet-access tools to Iranian civilians, expressly subject to existing sanctions and export controls. Affected: Agencies and interested technology providers. Enforcement: Existing restrictions continue to apply

``(12) work with the appropriate officials of the Department of the Treasury and the Department of Commerce to ensure that, consistent with applicable sanctions and export control laws and regulations, companies are able to provide to Iranian civilians technology and other tools necessary to access the open internet;

Proposed § 414(a)(12)–(13) · Individual Rights — Requires federal coordination to facilitate lawful provision of open-internet technologies and a strategy for circumventing Iranian internet blackouts. Enforcement: Interagency planning and reporting

``(13) assess the ability of the Iranian regime to cut off all access to the internet and develop a strategy to circumvent internet blackouts for Iranian civil society;''; and (D) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

Sec. 3(a)(1)(D), proposed § 414(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires regular interagency strategy review and submission of updated strategies to Congress, including implementation progress and coordination assessments

``(b) Updates.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall--

Sec. 3(a)(1)(D), proposed § 414(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires regular interagency strategy review and submission of updated strategies to Congress, including implementation progress and coordination assessments

``(1) regularly review the strategy under subsection (a); and

Sec. 3(a)(1)(D), proposed § 414(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires regular interagency strategy review and submission of updated strategies to Congress, including implementation progress and coordination assessments

``(2) submit to the appropriate congressional committees on a regular basis an updated strategy that-- ``(A) takes into account the results of such review; and ``(B) includes with each such update the status of the implementation of such strategy, including an assessment of progress made toward promoting widespread internet freedom in Iran and expanding access to information for Iranian citizens and an evaluation of the degree to which efforts carried out by Federal departments and agencies that relate to digital freedom initiatives in Iran are effectively coordinated.''.
(2) Submission of updates.-- (A) First update.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall-- (i) update, pursuant to subsection (b) of section 414 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8754), as added by paragraph (1), the strategy required by subsection (a) of such section 414; and (ii) submit such updated strategy to the appropriate congressional committees. (B) Form.--The strategy under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (C) Subsequent updates.--The Secretary should update the strategy required by subsection (a) of such section 414, in accordance with subsection (b) of such section, at least annually.

SEC. 4. SAFEGUARDS FOR DIRECT-TO-CELL AND OTHER SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS COVERAGE.

Sec. 4(a)(1)–(2) · Economic Freedom — Requires the FCC, when considering new or modified direct-to-cell or satellite licenses and market-access grants, to consider encouraging licensees not to intentionally disable, degrade, or geoblock Iran coverage, subject to legal, interference, and network-security exceptions. Affected: FCC and satellite operators. Enforcement: Licensing consideration; the bill does not expressly impose an unconditional coverage mandate

Sec. 4(a) · Government Power — Adds an FCC licensing consideration, subject to specified exceptions

(a) FCC Consideration Required in Granting New Licenses, License Modifications, and Grants of Market Access.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in granting on or after the date of the enactment of this Act any license, license modification, or grant of market access for the provision of DTC communications or other satellite communications, the Federal Communications Commission (in this section referred to as the ``Commission'') shall consider encouraging the licensee or grantee to refrain from intentionally disabling, degrading, or geoblocking DTC communications or other satellite communications coverage of Iran, except--

Sec. 4(a)(1)–(2) · Economic Freedom — Requires the FCC, when considering new or modified direct-to-cell or satellite licenses and market-access grants, to consider encouraging licensees not to intentionally disable, degrade, or geoblock Iran coverage, subject to legal, interference, and network-security exceptions. Affected: FCC and satellite operators. Enforcement: Licensing consideration; the bill does not expressly impose an unconditional coverage mandate

Sec. 4(a) · Government Power — Adds an FCC licensing consideration, subject to specified exceptions

(1) to the extent specifically required by Federal law, an order of the Commission, or an international coordination agreement designed solely to prevent harmful interference; or

Sec. 4(a)(1)–(2) · Economic Freedom — Requires the FCC, when considering new or modified direct-to-cell or satellite licenses and market-access grants, to consider encouraging licensees not to intentionally disable, degrade, or geoblock Iran coverage, subject to legal, interference, and network-security exceptions. Affected: FCC and satellite operators. Enforcement: Licensing consideration; the bill does not expressly impose an unconditional coverage mandate

Sec. 4(a) · Government Power — Adds an FCC licensing consideration, subject to specified exceptions

(2) for a limited period necessary to mitigate an imminent threat to the integrity or security of the network of the licensee or grantee, if normal coverage is restored as soon as practicable.

Sec. 4(b) · Government Power — Expresses a nonbinding congressional view about U.S. advocacy at international telecommunications bodies

(b) International Advocacy.--It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the Commission, should oppose at the International Telecommunication Union or any successor body any proposal that would compel or encourage geographic exclusion of Iran specifically from DTC communications or other satellite communications coverage provided by operators that hold licenses or grants of market access granted by the Commission.

Sec. 4(c)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires a State Department briefing within 180 days and annually for five years on relevant international advocacy and known satellite-coverage exclusions

(c) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall brief the appropriate congressional committees on--

Sec. 4(c)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires a State Department briefing within 180 days and annually for five years on relevant international advocacy and known satellite-coverage exclusions

(1) actions taken pursuant to subsection (b); and

Sec. 4(c)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires a State Department briefing within 180 days and annually for five years on relevant international advocacy and known satellite-coverage exclusions

(2) in coordination with the Commission-- (A) any known instances in which a DTC communications or other satellite communications operator that holds a license or grant of market access granted by the Commission intentionally excluded coverage of Iran; and (B) the basis for any exclusion described in subparagraph (A).

SEC. 5. CYBERSECURITY CAPACITY FOR CIVIL SOCIETY IN IRAN.

Sec. 5(a)(1)–(3) · Individual Rights — Requires State to seek cybersecurity training, secure communication tools, and multilingual educational materials for journalists, human-rights defenders, and civil society actors in Iran. Affected: Intended overseas beneficiaries and federal administrators. Enforcement: Federal program and reporting duties, not new obligations on Iranian citizens

Sec. 5(a)(2)–(3) · Privacy and Due Process — Directs attention to tools that minimize detection risks, including VPNs and end-to-end encrypted messaging. No compulsory personal surveillance or reporting is created

(a) Training and Tools.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall seek to establish or expand existing programs to--

Sec. 5(a)(1)–(3) · Individual Rights — Requires State to seek cybersecurity training, secure communication tools, and multilingual educational materials for journalists, human-rights defenders, and civil society actors in Iran. Affected: Intended overseas beneficiaries and federal administrators. Enforcement: Federal program and reporting duties, not new obligations on Iranian citizens

(1) deliver remote or in-person cybersecurity training to journalists, human rights defenders, and other civil society actors in Iran;

Sec. 5(a)(1)–(3) · Individual Rights — Requires State to seek cybersecurity training, secure communication tools, and multilingual educational materials for journalists, human-rights defenders, and civil society actors in Iran. Affected: Intended overseas beneficiaries and federal administrators. Enforcement: Federal program and reporting duties, not new obligations on Iranian citizens

Sec. 5(a)(2)–(3) · Privacy and Due Process — Directs attention to tools that minimize detection risks, including VPNs and end-to-end encrypted messaging. No compulsory personal surveillance or reporting is created

(2) furnish vetted open-source or commercially available digital safety tools to such actors, prioritizing VPN services and other software-based solutions that minimize physical detection risks, including end to-end encrypted messaging applications; and

Sec. 5(a)(1)–(3) · Individual Rights — Requires State to seek cybersecurity training, secure communication tools, and multilingual educational materials for journalists, human-rights defenders, and civil society actors in Iran. Affected: Intended overseas beneficiaries and federal administrators. Enforcement: Federal program and reporting duties, not new obligations on Iranian citizens

Sec. 5(a)(2)–(3) · Privacy and Due Process — Directs attention to tools that minimize detection risks, including VPNs and end-to-end encrypted messaging. No compulsory personal surveillance or reporting is created

(3) provide multilingual educational materials that warn Iranian users about regime-controlled applications and phishing campaigns.

Sec. 5(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires effectiveness assessments and a GAO evaluation within three years

(b) Reporting and Evaluation.--

Sec. 5(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires effectiveness assessments and a GAO evaluation within three years

(1) Metrics.--The Secretary of State shall make available to the appropriate congressional committees evaluations and assessments on the effectiveness of the programs established or expanded pursuant to subsection (a).

Sec. 5(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — Requires effectiveness assessments and a GAO evaluation within three years

(2) Independent evaluation.--Not later than 3 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an evaluation of the effectiveness of the programs carried out pursuant to this section.

SEC. 6. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Sec. 6(a)–(b) · Economic Freedom — Authorizes $15 million annually for FY2027 and FY2028 for the Secs. 4–5 activities, with appropriated amounts authorized to remain available until expended. Enforcement: Federal appropriations/program administration; an authorization is not an appropriation

(a) In General.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State $15,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2027 and 2028 to carry out sections 4 and 5, including through programs that expand access to secure VPN services for individuals in Iran.

Sec. 6(a)–(b) · Economic Freedom — Authorizes $15 million annually for FY2027 and FY2028 for the Secs. 4–5 activities, with appropriated amounts authorized to remain available until expended. Enforcement: Federal appropriations/program administration; an authorization is not an appropriation

(b) Availability.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization under subsection (a) are authorized to remain available until expended.

SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

Sec. 7(1)–(3) · Government Power — Defines the appropriate congressional committees, direct-to-cell communications, and relevant satellite communications

(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--

Sec. 7(1)–(3) · Government Power — Defines the appropriate congressional committees, direct-to-cell communications, and relevant satellite communications

(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

Sec. 7(1)–(3) · Government Power — Defines the appropriate congressional committees, direct-to-cell communications, and relevant satellite communications

(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

Sec. 7(1)–(3) · Government Power — Defines the appropriate congressional committees, direct-to-cell communications, and relevant satellite communications

(2) ESIM technology.--The term ``eSIM technology'' means embedded subscriber identity module technology that allows a user to remotely activate cellular service on a compatible device without a physical SIM card.

Sec. 7(1)–(3) · Government Power — Defines the appropriate congressional committees, direct-to-cell communications, and relevant satellite communications

(3) VPN services.--The term ``VPN services'' means encrypted internet connections designed to bypass a government's censorship and surveillance, enabling secure and unrestricted access to the open internet.

SEC. 8. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this Act may be construed to--
(1) limit the authority of the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.);
(2) authorize any transaction prohibited under United States sanctions or export control laws; or
(3) require a DTC communications or other satellite communications operator that holds a license or grant of market access granted by the Federal Communications Commission to market, sell, activate, or collect payment for services in Iran or any other United States person to provide goods, services, or technology in violation of such laws. <all>

Findings source: bill-scores-v2-batch39-findings-2026-11-14.md. Highlights come only from that file; no finding, score, or provision was invented for this page.

What you can do

Contact your U.S. Representative and Senators about this bill.

Find your Representative Contact your Senators

Spot an error on this page? Report it.