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HR 10797 — Aerial Transport and High Consequence Infectious Diseases Act
Freedom score: -1 (scale −10 to +10)
- Individual rights: 0
- Property rights: 0
- Economic freedom: 0
- Privacy & due process: 0
- Government power: -1
Sponsor: Rep. Bacon, Don [R-NE-2] · Latest action: Referred to the House Committee on Armed Services. (2026-10-13)
Full text on GovInfo (introduced version) · Congress.gov · ← Bill Library index
Findings — 5 highlighted provisions
Each item below is one provision documented in the findings file. The same provision is highlighted in the full text underneath, with its section citation and criterion. Everything else on this page is plain, unreviewed bill text.
- Sec. 1 — gives the short title See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — directs the Air Force, in military medical coordination, to create a Department of Defense long-range aeromedical transport capability for patients known or suspected of high-consequence infectious disease, starting no later than October 1, 2027 See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — requires a Defense Department patient-transport component, with support to other governments/civilian partners at Defense Secretary discretion See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(c)(1)–(4) · Government Power — directs clinical safety standards, personnel training/certification, executive-agent responsibility and lifecycle management of protective/isolation gear; §2(c)(5)–(8) directs doctrine, specialist teams, civilian/academic interagency coordination, capability-gap study and medical countermeasure/system research See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(d) · Government Power — directs DoD-wide doctrine, oversight and sustainment. No new involuntary quarantine, compelled medical treatment, civilian detention power, international travel prohibition, criminal penalty or separate explicit appropriation is written into §2. This is operational preparedness, not a pandemic restrictions bill See in text ↓
Full text (introduced version)
11 of 15 text blocks highlighted. Source: GovInfo, fetched cached.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
Sec. 1 — gives the short title
SEC. 2. AERIAL TRANSPORT AND DEPARTMENT-WIDE CAPABILITY FOR HIGH- CONSEQUENCE INFECTIOUS DISEASES.
Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — directs the Air Force, in military medical coordination, to create a Department of Defense long-range aeromedical transport capability for patients known or suspected of high-consequence infectious disease, starting no later than October 1, 2027
Sec. 2(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — requires a Defense Department patient-transport component, with support to other governments/civilian partners at Defense Secretary discretion
Sec. 2(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — requires a Defense Department patient-transport component, with support to other governments/civilian partners at Defense Secretary discretion
Sec. 2(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — requires a Defense Department patient-transport component, with support to other governments/civilian partners at Defense Secretary discretion
Sec. 2(c)(1)–(4) · Government Power — directs clinical safety standards, personnel training/certification, executive-agent responsibility and lifecycle management of protective/isolation gear; §2(c)(5)–(8) directs doctrine, specialist teams, civilian/academic interagency coordination, capability-gap study and medical countermeasure/system research
Sec. 2(c)(1)–(4) · Government Power — directs clinical safety standards, personnel training/certification, executive-agent responsibility and lifecycle management of protective/isolation gear; §2(c)(5)–(8) directs doctrine, specialist teams, civilian/academic interagency coordination, capability-gap study and medical countermeasure/system research
Sec. 2(c)(1)–(4) · Government Power — directs clinical safety standards, personnel training/certification, executive-agent responsibility and lifecycle management of protective/isolation gear; §2(c)(5)–(8) directs doctrine, specialist teams, civilian/academic interagency coordination, capability-gap study and medical countermeasure/system research
Sec. 2(c)(1)–(4) · Government Power — directs clinical safety standards, personnel training/certification, executive-agent responsibility and lifecycle management of protective/isolation gear; §2(c)(5)–(8) directs doctrine, specialist teams, civilian/academic interagency coordination, capability-gap study and medical countermeasure/system research
Sec. 2(c)(1)–(4) · Government Power — directs clinical safety standards, personnel training/certification, executive-agent responsibility and lifecycle management of protective/isolation gear; §2(c)(5)–(8) directs doctrine, specialist teams, civilian/academic interagency coordination, capability-gap study and medical countermeasure/system research
Sec. 2(d) · Government Power — directs DoD-wide doctrine, oversight and sustainment. No new involuntary quarantine, compelled medical treatment, civilian detention power, international travel prohibition, criminal penalty or separate explicit appropriation is written into §2. This is operational preparedness, not a pandemic restrictions bill
Findings source: bill-scores-v2-batch41-findings-2026-11-15.md. Highlights come only from that file; no finding, score, or provision was invented for this page.
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