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HR 10797 — Aerial Transport and High Consequence Infectious Diseases Act

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Sponsor: Rep. Bacon, Don [R-NE-2] · Latest action: Referred to the House Committee on Armed Services. (2026-10-13)

Full text on GovInfo (introduced version) · Congress.gov · ← Bill Library index

Findings — 5 highlighted provisions

Each item below is one provision documented in the findings file. The same provision is highlighted in the full text underneath, with its section citation and criterion. Everything else on this page is plain, unreviewed bill text.

  1. Sec. 1 — gives the short title See in text ↓
  2. Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — directs the Air Force, in military medical coordination, to create a Department of Defense long-range aeromedical transport capability for patients known or suspected of high-consequence infectious disease, starting no later than October 1, 2027 See in text ↓
  3. Sec. 2(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — requires a Defense Department patient-transport component, with support to other governments/civilian partners at Defense Secretary discretion See in text ↓
  4. Sec. 2(c)(1)–(4) · Government Power — directs clinical safety standards, personnel training/certification, executive-agent responsibility and lifecycle management of protective/isolation gear; §2(c)(5)–(8) directs doctrine, specialist teams, civilian/academic interagency coordination, capability-gap study and medical countermeasure/system research See in text ↓
  5. Sec. 2(d) · Government Power — directs DoD-wide doctrine, oversight and sustainment. No new involuntary quarantine, compelled medical treatment, civilian detention power, international travel prohibition, criminal penalty or separate explicit appropriation is written into §2. This is operational preparedness, not a pandemic restrictions bill See in text ↓

Full text (introduced version)

11 of 15 text blocks highlighted. Source: GovInfo, fetched cached.

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] [H.R. 10797 Introduced in House (IH)] <DOC> 119th CONGRESS 2d Session H. R. 10797 To direct the Secretary of the Air Force to carry out a program to provide for the safe, long-range aerial transport of individuals known to be infected, or suspected of infection, by high-consequence infectious diseases. _______________________________________________________________________ IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES October 13, 2026 Mr. Bacon introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services _______________________________________________________________________ A BILL To direct the Secretary of the Air Force to carry out a program to provide for the safe, long-range aerial transport of individuals known to be infected, or suspected of infection, by high-consequence infectious diseases. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

Sec. 1 — gives the short title

This Act may be cited as the ``Aerial Transport and High Consequence Infectious Diseases Act''.

SEC. 2. AERIAL TRANSPORT AND DEPARTMENT-WIDE CAPABILITY FOR HIGH- CONSEQUENCE INFECTIOUS DISEASES.

Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — directs the Air Force, in military medical coordination, to create a Department of Defense long-range aeromedical transport capability for patients known or suspected of high-consequence infectious disease, starting no later than October 1, 2027

(a) Requirement.--Beginning not later than October 1, 2027, the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the Secretaries of the other military departments, and the Director of the Defense Health Agency, shall carry out a Department program to provide for the safe, long- range aerial transport of individuals known to be or suspected of infection by high-consequence infectious diseases.

Sec. 2(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — requires a Defense Department patient-transport component, with support to other governments/civilian partners at Defense Secretary discretion

(b) Aerial Transport Component.--The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the program under subsection (a) serves as the component of the Department of Defense that--

Sec. 2(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — requires a Defense Department patient-transport component, with support to other governments/civilian partners at Defense Secretary discretion

(1) provides the Department with aerial transport of patients with high-consequence infectious diseases; and

Sec. 2(b)(1)–(2) · Government Power — requires a Defense Department patient-transport component, with support to other governments/civilian partners at Defense Secretary discretion

(2) provides support to other departments and equivalent program agencies of the Federal Government, State and local governments, and civilian and academic partners, as determined appropriate by the Secretary.

Sec. 2(c)(1)–(4) · Government Power — directs clinical safety standards, personnel training/certification, executive-agent responsibility and lifecycle management of protective/isolation gear; §2(c)(5)–(8) directs doctrine, specialist teams, civilian/academic interagency coordination, capability-gap study and medical countermeasure/system research

(c) Program Requirements.--In carrying out the program under subsection (a), the Secretary of the Air Force shall--

Sec. 2(c)(1)–(4) · Government Power — directs clinical safety standards, personnel training/certification, executive-agent responsibility and lifecycle management of protective/isolation gear; §2(c)(5)–(8) directs doctrine, specialist teams, civilian/academic interagency coordination, capability-gap study and medical countermeasure/system research

(1) develop and maintain a curriculum, and identify qualified instructors to train and certify Department of Defense medical personnel, on procedures associated with the safe, long-range aerial transport of patients with high- consequence infectious diseases;

Sec. 2(c)(1)–(4) · Government Power — directs clinical safety standards, personnel training/certification, executive-agent responsibility and lifecycle management of protective/isolation gear; §2(c)(5)–(8) directs doctrine, specialist teams, civilian/academic interagency coordination, capability-gap study and medical countermeasure/system research

(2) establish, and periodically update Department medical care standards, infection prevention and control measures, and operational safety protocols necessary to maximize patient survival and minimize infection risk to aircrew, medical personnel, and support personnel;

Sec. 2(c)(1)–(4) · Government Power — directs clinical safety standards, personnel training/certification, executive-agent responsibility and lifecycle management of protective/isolation gear; §2(c)(5)–(8) directs doctrine, specialist teams, civilian/academic interagency coordination, capability-gap study and medical countermeasure/system research

(3) serve as the joint force advocate and executive agent within the Department of Defense for aerial transport of individuals with high-consequence infectious diseases;

Sec. 2(c)(1)–(4) · Government Power — directs clinical safety standards, personnel training/certification, executive-agent responsibility and lifecycle management of protective/isolation gear; §2(c)(5)–(8) directs doctrine, specialist teams, civilian/academic interagency coordination, capability-gap study and medical countermeasure/system research

(4) establish standards, sustainment requirements, and lifecycle management processes for personal protective equipment, transport isolation systems, and associated medical equipment used in transporting infected patients;
(5) develop, in coordination with the Joint Staff, joint doctrine, concepts of operation, and medical force requirements necessary to support a Department of Defense-wide high- consequence infectious disease capability, including patient movement, definitive care, and integration across the continuum of care;
(6) coordinate with the other Secretaries of the military departments and the Director of the Defense Health Agency to inform the organization, training, and equipping of specialized, organized teams capable of conducting high- consequence infectious disease patient movement and care in operational, austere, and strategic environments;
(7) support the Department's role facilitating interoperability and operational integration with other departments and agencies of the Federal Government, State and local governments, and civilian and academic partners to enable coordinated response to tactical incidents, large-scale contingencies, and research activities related to emerging and future infectious disease threats; and
(8) identify Department wide capability gaps and support research, development, testing, and evaluation of medical countermeasures, transport systems, protective equipment, and operational procedures necessary to improve survivability, safety, and mission effectiveness in high-consequence infectious disease operations.

Sec. 2(d) · Government Power — directs DoD-wide doctrine, oversight and sustainment. No new involuntary quarantine, compelled medical treatment, civilian detention power, international travel prohibition, criminal penalty or separate explicit appropriation is written into §2. This is operational preparedness, not a pandemic restrictions bill

(d) Enterprise Doctrine and Oversight.--The Secretary of Defense shall develop and maintain Department of Defense-wide doctrine and policy to guide the development, fielding, sustainment, and employment of high-consequence infectious disease response capabilities across the Department. <all>

Findings source: bill-scores-v2-batch41-findings-2026-11-15.md. Highlights come only from that file; no finding, score, or provision was invented for this page.

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