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HR 10752 — CISA Securing AI Task Force Act

Freedom score: -1 (scale −10 to +10)

Sponsor: Rep. Carter, Troy A. [D-LA-2] · Latest action: Referred to the House Committee on Homeland Security. (2026-10-06)

Full text on GovInfo (introduced version) · Congress.gov · ← Bill Library index

Findings — 6 highlighted provisions

Each item below is one provision documented in the findings file. The same provision is highlighted in the full text underneath, with its section citation and criterion. Everything else on this page is plain, unreviewed bill text.

  1. Sec. 1 — Names the CISA Securing AI Task Force Act See in text ↓
  2. Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts See in text ↓
  3. Sec. 2(a)(1)–(5) · Government Power — Directs coordination of AI security design/deployment work and review/update recommendations for CISA guidance/programs; promotes defensive uses of AI and advice to stakeholders on cyber risks. These are agency functions, not new statutory mandates on private AI developers See in text ↓
  4. Sec. 2(a)(6)–(8) · Government Power — Identifies internal staffing gaps, coordinates promotion of secure AI software, and recommends additional CISA initiatives. The task force can recommend, but §2 does not itself give it regulatory or subpoena powers See in text ↓
  5. Sec. 2(a)(9)–(10) · Government Power — Directs CISA AI efforts to meet appropriate privacy, civil rights and liberties standards and to support publication/accuracy of the agency’s own AI-use inventory. No new authority to demand a registry of private firms’ models is provided See in text ↓
  6. Sec. 2(b)–(c) · Government Power — Requires briefings to two homeland security congressional committees every six months, beginning within six months of establishment. The Act ceases to have effect five years after enactment, limiting duration See in text ↓

Full text (introduced version)

14 of 14 text blocks highlighted. Source: GovInfo, fetched cached.

[Congressional Bills 119th Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] [H.R. 10752 Introduced in House (IH)] <DOC> 119th CONGRESS 2d Session H. R. 10752 To establish in the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency of the Department of Homeland Security a task force on artificial intelligence, and for other purposes. _______________________________________________________________________ IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES October 6, 2026 Mr. Carter of Louisiana (for himself and Mr. Thompson of Mississippi) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security _______________________________________________________________________ A BILL To establish in the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency of the Department of Homeland Security a task force on artificial intelligence, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

Sec. 1 — Names the CISA Securing AI Task Force Act

This Act may be cited as the ``CISA Securing AI Task Force Act''.

SEC. 2. TASK FORCE ON SECURING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE.

Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts

Sec. 2(a)(1)–(5) · Government Power — Directs coordination of AI security design/deployment work and review/update recommendations for CISA guidance/programs; promotes defensive uses of AI and advice to stakeholders on cyber risks. These are agency functions, not new statutory mandates on private AI developers

Sec. 2(a)(6)–(8) · Government Power — Identifies internal staffing gaps, coordinates promotion of secure AI software, and recommends additional CISA initiatives. The task force can recommend, but §2 does not itself give it regulatory or subpoena powers

Sec. 2(a)(9)–(10) · Government Power — Directs CISA AI efforts to meet appropriate privacy, civil rights and liberties standards and to support publication/accuracy of the agency’s own AI-use inventory. No new authority to demand a registry of private firms’ models is provided

(a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency of the Department of Homeland Security shall establish within the Agency a Task Force comprised of personnel from across its offices and divisions to coordinate future Agency activities related to the safety and security of artificial intelligence, and the Agency's contributions to Department-wide initiatives related to the safety and security of artificial intelligence. Such Task Force shall--

Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts

Sec. 2(a)(1)–(5) · Government Power — Directs coordination of AI security design/deployment work and review/update recommendations for CISA guidance/programs; promotes defensive uses of AI and advice to stakeholders on cyber risks. These are agency functions, not new statutory mandates on private AI developers

(1) ensure coordination, cohesion, and alignment of Agency efforts to improve the safe and secure design, development, adoption, and deployment of artificial intelligence;

Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts

Sec. 2(a)(1)–(5) · Government Power — Directs coordination of AI security design/deployment work and review/update recommendations for CISA guidance/programs; promotes defensive uses of AI and advice to stakeholders on cyber risks. These are agency functions, not new statutory mandates on private AI developers

(2) ensure coordination, cohesion, and alignment of Agency input into Department-led, interagency, and nongovernment working groups or collaborations related to artificial intelligence;

Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts

Sec. 2(a)(1)–(5) · Government Power — Directs coordination of AI security design/deployment work and review/update recommendations for CISA guidance/programs; promotes defensive uses of AI and advice to stakeholders on cyber risks. These are agency functions, not new statutory mandates on private AI developers

(3) assess and evaluate relevant Agency safety and security initiatives, guidance, and programs to ensure the unique safety and security challenges related to artificial intelligence are contemplated and addressed and recommend updates to such initiatives, guidance, and programs, as appropriate;

Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts

Sec. 2(a)(1)–(5) · Government Power — Directs coordination of AI security design/deployment work and review/update recommendations for CISA guidance/programs; promotes defensive uses of AI and advice to stakeholders on cyber risks. These are agency functions, not new statutory mandates on private AI developers

(4) ensure the full expertise from across the Agency is leveraged to identify how artificial intelligence can be used to defend against traditional and emerging cyber threats;

Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts

Sec. 2(a)(1)–(5) · Government Power — Directs coordination of AI security design/deployment work and review/update recommendations for CISA guidance/programs; promotes defensive uses of AI and advice to stakeholders on cyber risks. These are agency functions, not new statutory mandates on private AI developers

(5) ensure coordination of Agency efforts to advise stakeholders of potential cyber risks associated with the deployment of artificial intelligence-based software;

Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts

Sec. 2(a)(6)–(8) · Government Power — Identifies internal staffing gaps, coordinates promotion of secure AI software, and recommends additional CISA initiatives. The task force can recommend, but §2 does not itself give it regulatory or subpoena powers

(6) identify artificial intelligence workforce gaps at the Agency and ways to address them;

Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts

Sec. 2(a)(6)–(8) · Government Power — Identifies internal staffing gaps, coordinates promotion of secure AI software, and recommends additional CISA initiatives. The task force can recommend, but §2 does not itself give it regulatory or subpoena powers

(7) coordinate the Agency's efforts to promote the adoption of secure artificial intelligence-based software;

Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts

Sec. 2(a)(6)–(8) · Government Power — Identifies internal staffing gaps, coordinates promotion of secure AI software, and recommends additional CISA initiatives. The task force can recommend, but §2 does not itself give it regulatory or subpoena powers

(8) recommend to the Director new Agency initiatives to improve the safe and secure design, development, adoption, and deployment of artificial intelligence;

Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts

Sec. 2(a)(9)–(10) · Government Power — Directs CISA AI efforts to meet appropriate privacy, civil rights and liberties standards and to support publication/accuracy of the agency’s own AI-use inventory. No new authority to demand a registry of private firms’ models is provided

(9) ensure the Agency's efforts related to artificial intelligence meet appropriate privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties standards; and

Sec. 2(a) · Government Power — opening text (Establishment): Requires CISA’s Director to establish an internal, cross-office task force within one year to coordinate agency AI safety/security work and input into DHS and interagency/nongovernment efforts

Sec. 2(a)(9)–(10) · Government Power — Directs CISA AI efforts to meet appropriate privacy, civil rights and liberties standards and to support publication/accuracy of the agency’s own AI-use inventory. No new authority to demand a registry of private firms’ models is provided

(10) support the publication of the Agency's artificial intelligence use inventory, including developing processes to ensure the accuracy of artificial intelligence inventory submissions and the reliability of data used in artificial intelligence systems used by the Agency.

Sec. 2(b)–(c) · Government Power — Requires briefings to two homeland security congressional committees every six months, beginning within six months of establishment. The Act ceases to have effect five years after enactment, limiting duration

(b) Biannual Briefings.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the establishment of the Task Force under subsection (a), and every 6 months thereafter until such time as this Act ceases to be in effect in accordance with subsection (c), the Task Force shall report to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate on the activities of such Task Force during the preceding 6-month period.

Sec. 2(b)–(c) · Government Power — Requires briefings to two homeland security congressional committees every six months, beginning within six months of establishment. The Act ceases to have effect five years after enactment, limiting duration

(c) Sunset.--This Act shall cease to be in effect on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. <all>

Findings source: bill-scores-v2-batch45-findings-2026-11-15.md. Highlights come only from that file; no finding, score, or provision was invented for this page.

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