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HR 10705 — Stop SIM Box Scams Act
Freedom score: -8 (scale −10 to +10)
- Individual rights: -1
- Property rights: -1
- Economic freedom: -2
- Privacy & due process: -2
- Government power: -2
Sponsor: Rep. Shreve, Jefferson [R-IN-6] · Latest action: Referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. (2026-10-01)
Full text on GovInfo (introduced version) · Congress.gov · ← Bill Library index
Findings — 14 highlighted provisions
Each item below is one provision documented in the findings file. The same provision is highlighted in the full text underneath, with its section citation and criterion. Everything else on this page is plain, unreviewed bill text.
- Sec. 2(a), new Communications Act §346(a)(1)–(3) · Individual Rights — Broadly prohibits any individual or entity in/affecting interstate/foreign commerce from manufacturing, importing, selling, leasing, advertising, possessing, using or distributing defined SIM boxes; also bans modification of other systems into SIM-box functionality and assistance, including knowingly hosting prohibited activity on owned property. Ban reaches commercial advertising and some personal use; existing Communications Act remedies apply See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(b), amending 47 U.S.C. 510(a) · Property Rights — Adds devices/items involved in new SIM-box prohibited activities to federally forfeitable communications devices; creates confiscation exposure for owners who violate §346, subject to existing forfeiture law See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(a), new §346(a)(3) · Property Rights — Makes knowing facilitation on a person’s property one basis for violating the new ban, even when the underlying SIM-box activity is carried out by another person See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(a), new §346(a)(1)–(3), (b) · Economic Freedom — Bans manufacture, sale, rent, use, advertising and enabling software of qualifying SIM-box devices after a 180-day delayed start; materially forecloses a specified class of telecommunications transactions See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(a), new §346(c)(1)–(3), (h)(3)(A)–(B) · Economic Freedom — FCC must issue definitions/implementation rules, lists of forbidden/permitted uses and exclusion-certification/advertising procedures. Definition reaches physical/virtual/cloud multiplexing of 2+ credentials where designed, advertised or reasonably expected to disguise origin, defeat traceback or circumvent lawful carrier controls; exemptions include FCC-approved, official government, recognized lab, provider internal test and FCC-designated uses See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(a), new §346(e)(3) · Economic Freedom — Gives injured mobile-service providers federal court actions for injunction and damages and potential prevailing-party attorney fees, creating private enforcement in addition to FCC remedies See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(a), new §346(g)(1)(A)–(B) · Privacy and Due Process — Provides mobile carriers broad good-faith, reasonable-basis immunity for monitoring their networks and giving agencies access to communications records, contents, related customer information, facilities, and assistance to counter SIM boxes See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(a), new §346(g)(2)–(3) · Privacy and Due Process — Safe harbor excludes unrelated purposes and bad faith/gross negligence and creates NO affirmative carrier duty to monitor or disclose; nevertheless the immunity can expand voluntary government access without new warrant or customer notice in this section See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(c), amending 47 U.S.C. 222(d)(5) · Privacy and Due Process — Adds permission for providers to furnish assistance to federal agencies regarding a SIM box to existing customer-proprietary-information exceptions See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(a), new §346(e)(2) · Privacy and Due Process — FCC can issue immediate temporary cease-and-desist orders for up to 180 days, with notice/hearing required for extensions; no express initial pre-order hearing is provided See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(a), new §346(c)–(d) · Government Power — FCC must promulgate rules within 180 days and coordinate with DHS, CBP, DOJ, FTC, other federal and state agencies on imports, enforcement, training and information sharing See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(a), new §346(e)(1)–(3) · Government Power — Each covered item and each day of continuing violation may be a separate enforceable violation; FCC cease-and-desist power and mobile-carrier private damages/injunction suits are added. No new explicit prison term appears in this section See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(a), new §346(f)–(g) · Government Power — FCC must report annually after first year on implementation/enforcement; carrier immunity facilitates evidence sharing and monitoring but excludes unrelated or bad-faith conduct See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(d)–(f) · Government Power — Preserves other federal caller-ID/robocall/security/spectrum authorities; preempts inconsistent state law BUT expressly permits MORE restrictive state SIM-box laws; protects remainder of Act if part invalidated See in text ↓
Full text (introduced version)
44 of 47 text blocks highlighted. Source: GovInfo, fetched cached.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
SEC. 2. SIM BOXES.
Sec. 2(a), new Communications Act §346(a)(1)–(3) · Individual Rights — Broadly prohibits any individual or entity in/affecting interstate/foreign commerce from manufacturing, importing, selling, leasing, advertising, possessing, using or distributing defined SIM boxes; also bans modification of other systems into SIM-box functionality and assistance, including knowingly hosting prohibited activity on owned property. Ban reaches commercial advertising and some personal use; existing Communications Act remedies apply
Sec. 2(a), new §346(a)(3) · Property Rights — Makes knowing facilitation on a person’s property one basis for violating the new ban, even when the underlying SIM-box activity is carried out by another person
Sec. 2(a), new §346(a)(1)–(3), (b) · Economic Freedom — Bans manufacture, sale, rent, use, advertising and enabling software of qualifying SIM-box devices after a 180-day delayed start; materially forecloses a specified class of telecommunications transactions
Sec. 2(a), new §346(c)(1)–(3), (h)(3)(A)–(B) · Economic Freedom — FCC must issue definitions/implementation rules, lists of forbidden/permitted uses and exclusion-certification/advertising procedures. Definition reaches physical/virtual/cloud multiplexing of 2+ credentials where designed, advertised or reasonably expected to disguise origin, defeat traceback or circumvent lawful carrier controls; exemptions include FCC-approved, official government, recognized lab, provider internal test and FCC-designated uses
Sec. 2(a), new §346(e)(3) · Economic Freedom — Gives injured mobile-service providers federal court actions for injunction and damages and potential prevailing-party attorney fees, creating private enforcement in addition to FCC remedies
Sec. 2(a), new §346(g)(1)(A)–(B) · Privacy and Due Process — Provides mobile carriers broad good-faith, reasonable-basis immunity for monitoring their networks and giving agencies access to communications records, contents, related customer information, facilities, and assistance to counter SIM boxes
Sec. 2(a), new §346(g)(2)–(3) · Privacy and Due Process — Safe harbor excludes unrelated purposes and bad faith/gross negligence and creates NO affirmative carrier duty to monitor or disclose; nevertheless the immunity can expand voluntary government access without new warrant or customer notice in this section
Sec. 2(a), new §346(e)(2) · Privacy and Due Process — FCC can issue immediate temporary cease-and-desist orders for up to 180 days, with notice/hearing required for extensions; no express initial pre-order hearing is provided
Sec. 2(a), new §346(c)–(d) · Government Power — FCC must promulgate rules within 180 days and coordinate with DHS, CBP, DOJ, FTC, other federal and state agencies on imports, enforcement, training and information sharing
Sec. 2(a), new §346(e)(1)–(3) · Government Power — Each covered item and each day of continuing violation may be a separate enforceable violation; FCC cease-and-desist power and mobile-carrier private damages/injunction suits are added. No new explicit prison term appears in this section
Sec. 2(a), new §346(f)–(g) · Government Power — FCC must report annually after first year on implementation/enforcement; carrier immunity facilitates evidence sharing and monitoring but excludes unrelated or bad-faith conduct
Sec. 2(a), new Communications Act §346(a)(1)–(3) · Individual Rights — Broadly prohibits any individual or entity in/affecting interstate/foreign commerce from manufacturing, importing, selling, leasing, advertising, possessing, using or distributing defined SIM boxes; also bans modification of other systems into SIM-box functionality and assistance, including knowingly hosting prohibited activity on owned property. Ban reaches commercial advertising and some personal use; existing Communications Act remedies apply
Sec. 2(a), new §346(a)(3) · Property Rights — Makes knowing facilitation on a person’s property one basis for violating the new ban, even when the underlying SIM-box activity is carried out by another person
Sec. 2(a), new §346(a)(1)–(3), (b) · Economic Freedom — Bans manufacture, sale, rent, use, advertising and enabling software of qualifying SIM-box devices after a 180-day delayed start; materially forecloses a specified class of telecommunications transactions
Sec. 2(a), new Communications Act §346(a)(1)–(3) · Individual Rights — Broadly prohibits any individual or entity in/affecting interstate/foreign commerce from manufacturing, importing, selling, leasing, advertising, possessing, using or distributing defined SIM boxes; also bans modification of other systems into SIM-box functionality and assistance, including knowingly hosting prohibited activity on owned property. Ban reaches commercial advertising and some personal use; existing Communications Act remedies apply
Sec. 2(a), new §346(a)(1)–(3), (b) · Economic Freedom — Bans manufacture, sale, rent, use, advertising and enabling software of qualifying SIM-box devices after a 180-day delayed start; materially forecloses a specified class of telecommunications transactions
Sec. 2(a), new Communications Act §346(a)(1)–(3) · Individual Rights — Broadly prohibits any individual or entity in/affecting interstate/foreign commerce from manufacturing, importing, selling, leasing, advertising, possessing, using or distributing defined SIM boxes; also bans modification of other systems into SIM-box functionality and assistance, including knowingly hosting prohibited activity on owned property. Ban reaches commercial advertising and some personal use; existing Communications Act remedies apply
Sec. 2(a), new §346(a)(1)–(3), (b) · Economic Freedom — Bans manufacture, sale, rent, use, advertising and enabling software of qualifying SIM-box devices after a 180-day delayed start; materially forecloses a specified class of telecommunications transactions
Sec. 2(a), new Communications Act §346(a)(1)–(3) · Individual Rights — Broadly prohibits any individual or entity in/affecting interstate/foreign commerce from manufacturing, importing, selling, leasing, advertising, possessing, using or distributing defined SIM boxes; also bans modification of other systems into SIM-box functionality and assistance, including knowingly hosting prohibited activity on owned property. Ban reaches commercial advertising and some personal use; existing Communications Act remedies apply
Sec. 2(a), new §346(a)(3) · Property Rights — Makes knowing facilitation on a person’s property one basis for violating the new ban, even when the underlying SIM-box activity is carried out by another person
Sec. 2(a), new §346(a)(1)–(3), (b) · Economic Freedom — Bans manufacture, sale, rent, use, advertising and enabling software of qualifying SIM-box devices after a 180-day delayed start; materially forecloses a specified class of telecommunications transactions
Sec. 2(a), new §346(a)(1)–(3), (b) · Economic Freedom — Bans manufacture, sale, rent, use, advertising and enabling software of qualifying SIM-box devices after a 180-day delayed start; materially forecloses a specified class of telecommunications transactions
Sec. 2(a), new §346(c)(1)–(3), (h)(3)(A)–(B) · Economic Freedom — FCC must issue definitions/implementation rules, lists of forbidden/permitted uses and exclusion-certification/advertising procedures. Definition reaches physical/virtual/cloud multiplexing of 2+ credentials where designed, advertised or reasonably expected to disguise origin, defeat traceback or circumvent lawful carrier controls; exemptions include FCC-approved, official government, recognized lab, provider internal test and FCC-designated uses
Sec. 2(a), new §346(c)–(d) · Government Power — FCC must promulgate rules within 180 days and coordinate with DHS, CBP, DOJ, FTC, other federal and state agencies on imports, enforcement, training and information sharing
Sec. 2(a), new §346(c)(1)–(3), (h)(3)(A)–(B) · Economic Freedom — FCC must issue definitions/implementation rules, lists of forbidden/permitted uses and exclusion-certification/advertising procedures. Definition reaches physical/virtual/cloud multiplexing of 2+ credentials where designed, advertised or reasonably expected to disguise origin, defeat traceback or circumvent lawful carrier controls; exemptions include FCC-approved, official government, recognized lab, provider internal test and FCC-designated uses
Sec. 2(a), new §346(c)–(d) · Government Power — FCC must promulgate rules within 180 days and coordinate with DHS, CBP, DOJ, FTC, other federal and state agencies on imports, enforcement, training and information sharing
Sec. 2(a), new §346(c)(1)–(3), (h)(3)(A)–(B) · Economic Freedom — FCC must issue definitions/implementation rules, lists of forbidden/permitted uses and exclusion-certification/advertising procedures. Definition reaches physical/virtual/cloud multiplexing of 2+ credentials where designed, advertised or reasonably expected to disguise origin, defeat traceback or circumvent lawful carrier controls; exemptions include FCC-approved, official government, recognized lab, provider internal test and FCC-designated uses
Sec. 2(a), new §346(c)–(d) · Government Power — FCC must promulgate rules within 180 days and coordinate with DHS, CBP, DOJ, FTC, other federal and state agencies on imports, enforcement, training and information sharing
Sec. 2(a), new §346(c)(1)–(3), (h)(3)(A)–(B) · Economic Freedom — FCC must issue definitions/implementation rules, lists of forbidden/permitted uses and exclusion-certification/advertising procedures. Definition reaches physical/virtual/cloud multiplexing of 2+ credentials where designed, advertised or reasonably expected to disguise origin, defeat traceback or circumvent lawful carrier controls; exemptions include FCC-approved, official government, recognized lab, provider internal test and FCC-designated uses
Sec. 2(a), new §346(c)–(d) · Government Power — FCC must promulgate rules within 180 days and coordinate with DHS, CBP, DOJ, FTC, other federal and state agencies on imports, enforcement, training and information sharing
Sec. 2(a), new §346(c)–(d) · Government Power — FCC must promulgate rules within 180 days and coordinate with DHS, CBP, DOJ, FTC, other federal and state agencies on imports, enforcement, training and information sharing
Sec. 2(a), new §346(c)–(d) · Government Power — FCC must promulgate rules within 180 days and coordinate with DHS, CBP, DOJ, FTC, other federal and state agencies on imports, enforcement, training and information sharing
Sec. 2(a), new §346(c)–(d) · Government Power — FCC must promulgate rules within 180 days and coordinate with DHS, CBP, DOJ, FTC, other federal and state agencies on imports, enforcement, training and information sharing
Sec. 2(a), new §346(e)(3) · Economic Freedom — Gives injured mobile-service providers federal court actions for injunction and damages and potential prevailing-party attorney fees, creating private enforcement in addition to FCC remedies
Sec. 2(a), new §346(e)(2) · Privacy and Due Process — FCC can issue immediate temporary cease-and-desist orders for up to 180 days, with notice/hearing required for extensions; no express initial pre-order hearing is provided
Sec. 2(a), new §346(e)(1)–(3) · Government Power — Each covered item and each day of continuing violation may be a separate enforceable violation; FCC cease-and-desist power and mobile-carrier private damages/injunction suits are added. No new explicit prison term appears in this section
Sec. 2(a), new §346(e)(1)–(3) · Government Power — Each covered item and each day of continuing violation may be a separate enforceable violation; FCC cease-and-desist power and mobile-carrier private damages/injunction suits are added. No new explicit prison term appears in this section
Sec. 2(a), new §346(e)(2) · Privacy and Due Process — FCC can issue immediate temporary cease-and-desist orders for up to 180 days, with notice/hearing required for extensions; no express initial pre-order hearing is provided
Sec. 2(a), new §346(e)(1)–(3) · Government Power — Each covered item and each day of continuing violation may be a separate enforceable violation; FCC cease-and-desist power and mobile-carrier private damages/injunction suits are added. No new explicit prison term appears in this section
Sec. 2(a), new §346(e)(3) · Economic Freedom — Gives injured mobile-service providers federal court actions for injunction and damages and potential prevailing-party attorney fees, creating private enforcement in addition to FCC remedies
Sec. 2(a), new §346(e)(1)–(3) · Government Power — Each covered item and each day of continuing violation may be a separate enforceable violation; FCC cease-and-desist power and mobile-carrier private damages/injunction suits are added. No new explicit prison term appears in this section
Sec. 2(a), new §346(f)–(g) · Government Power — FCC must report annually after first year on implementation/enforcement; carrier immunity facilitates evidence sharing and monitoring but excludes unrelated or bad-faith conduct
Sec. 2(a), new §346(g)(1)(A)–(B) · Privacy and Due Process — Provides mobile carriers broad good-faith, reasonable-basis immunity for monitoring their networks and giving agencies access to communications records, contents, related customer information, facilities, and assistance to counter SIM boxes
Sec. 2(a), new §346(g)(2)–(3) · Privacy and Due Process — Safe harbor excludes unrelated purposes and bad faith/gross negligence and creates NO affirmative carrier duty to monitor or disclose; nevertheless the immunity can expand voluntary government access without new warrant or customer notice in this section
Sec. 2(a), new §346(f)–(g) · Government Power — FCC must report annually after first year on implementation/enforcement; carrier immunity facilitates evidence sharing and monitoring but excludes unrelated or bad-faith conduct
Sec. 2(a), new §346(g)(1)(A)–(B) · Privacy and Due Process — Provides mobile carriers broad good-faith, reasonable-basis immunity for monitoring their networks and giving agencies access to communications records, contents, related customer information, facilities, and assistance to counter SIM boxes
Sec. 2(a), new §346(f)–(g) · Government Power — FCC must report annually after first year on implementation/enforcement; carrier immunity facilitates evidence sharing and monitoring but excludes unrelated or bad-faith conduct
Sec. 2(a), new §346(g)(2)–(3) · Privacy and Due Process — Safe harbor excludes unrelated purposes and bad faith/gross negligence and creates NO affirmative carrier duty to monitor or disclose; nevertheless the immunity can expand voluntary government access without new warrant or customer notice in this section
Sec. 2(a), new §346(f)–(g) · Government Power — FCC must report annually after first year on implementation/enforcement; carrier immunity facilitates evidence sharing and monitoring but excludes unrelated or bad-faith conduct
Sec. 2(a), new §346(g)(2)–(3) · Privacy and Due Process — Safe harbor excludes unrelated purposes and bad faith/gross negligence and creates NO affirmative carrier duty to monitor or disclose; nevertheless the immunity can expand voluntary government access without new warrant or customer notice in this section
Sec. 2(a), new §346(f)–(g) · Government Power — FCC must report annually after first year on implementation/enforcement; carrier immunity facilitates evidence sharing and monitoring but excludes unrelated or bad-faith conduct
Sec. 2(a), new §346(c)(1)–(3), (h)(3)(A)–(B) · Economic Freedom — FCC must issue definitions/implementation rules, lists of forbidden/permitted uses and exclusion-certification/advertising procedures. Definition reaches physical/virtual/cloud multiplexing of 2+ credentials where designed, advertised or reasonably expected to disguise origin, defeat traceback or circumvent lawful carrier controls; exemptions include FCC-approved, official government, recognized lab, provider internal test and FCC-designated uses
Sec. 2(a), new §346(c)(1)–(3), (h)(3)(A)–(B) · Economic Freedom — FCC must issue definitions/implementation rules, lists of forbidden/permitted uses and exclusion-certification/advertising procedures. Definition reaches physical/virtual/cloud multiplexing of 2+ credentials where designed, advertised or reasonably expected to disguise origin, defeat traceback or circumvent lawful carrier controls; exemptions include FCC-approved, official government, recognized lab, provider internal test and FCC-designated uses
Sec. 2(b), amending 47 U.S.C. 510(a) · Property Rights — Adds devices/items involved in new SIM-box prohibited activities to federally forfeitable communications devices; creates confiscation exposure for owners who violate §346, subject to existing forfeiture law
Sec. 2(c), amending 47 U.S.C. 222(d)(5) · Privacy and Due Process — Adds permission for providers to furnish assistance to federal agencies regarding a SIM box to existing customer-proprietary-information exceptions
Sec. 2(c), amending 47 U.S.C. 222(d)(5) · Privacy and Due Process — Adds permission for providers to furnish assistance to federal agencies regarding a SIM box to existing customer-proprietary-information exceptions
Sec. 2(c), amending 47 U.S.C. 222(d)(5) · Privacy and Due Process — Adds permission for providers to furnish assistance to federal agencies regarding a SIM box to existing customer-proprietary-information exceptions
Sec. 2(c), amending 47 U.S.C. 222(d)(5) · Privacy and Due Process — Adds permission for providers to furnish assistance to federal agencies regarding a SIM box to existing customer-proprietary-information exceptions
Sec. 2(a), new §346(c)–(d) · Government Power — FCC must promulgate rules within 180 days and coordinate with DHS, CBP, DOJ, FTC, other federal and state agencies on imports, enforcement, training and information sharing
Sec. 2(d)–(f) · Government Power — Preserves other federal caller-ID/robocall/security/spectrum authorities; preempts inconsistent state law BUT expressly permits MORE restrictive state SIM-box laws; protects remainder of Act if part invalidated
Sec. 2(d)–(f) · Government Power — Preserves other federal caller-ID/robocall/security/spectrum authorities; preempts inconsistent state law BUT expressly permits MORE restrictive state SIM-box laws; protects remainder of Act if part invalidated
Sec. 2(d)–(f) · Government Power — Preserves other federal caller-ID/robocall/security/spectrum authorities; preempts inconsistent state law BUT expressly permits MORE restrictive state SIM-box laws; protects remainder of Act if part invalidated
Sec. 2(d)–(f) · Government Power — Preserves other federal caller-ID/robocall/security/spectrum authorities; preempts inconsistent state law BUT expressly permits MORE restrictive state SIM-box laws; protects remainder of Act if part invalidated
Sec. 2(d)–(f) · Government Power — Preserves other federal caller-ID/robocall/security/spectrum authorities; preempts inconsistent state law BUT expressly permits MORE restrictive state SIM-box laws; protects remainder of Act if part invalidated
Sec. 2(d)–(f) · Government Power — Preserves other federal caller-ID/robocall/security/spectrum authorities; preempts inconsistent state law BUT expressly permits MORE restrictive state SIM-box laws; protects remainder of Act if part invalidated
Sec. 2(d)–(f) · Government Power — Preserves other federal caller-ID/robocall/security/spectrum authorities; preempts inconsistent state law BUT expressly permits MORE restrictive state SIM-box laws; protects remainder of Act if part invalidated
Sec. 2(d)–(f) · Government Power — Preserves other federal caller-ID/robocall/security/spectrum authorities; preempts inconsistent state law BUT expressly permits MORE restrictive state SIM-box laws; protects remainder of Act if part invalidated
Sec. 2(d)–(f) · Government Power — Preserves other federal caller-ID/robocall/security/spectrum authorities; preempts inconsistent state law BUT expressly permits MORE restrictive state SIM-box laws; protects remainder of Act if part invalidated
Sec. 2(d)–(f) · Government Power — Preserves other federal caller-ID/robocall/security/spectrum authorities; preempts inconsistent state law BUT expressly permits MORE restrictive state SIM-box laws; protects remainder of Act if part invalidated
Sec. 2(d)–(f) · Government Power — Preserves other federal caller-ID/robocall/security/spectrum authorities; preempts inconsistent state law BUT expressly permits MORE restrictive state SIM-box laws; protects remainder of Act if part invalidated
Sec. 2(d)–(f) · Government Power — Preserves other federal caller-ID/robocall/security/spectrum authorities; preempts inconsistent state law BUT expressly permits MORE restrictive state SIM-box laws; protects remainder of Act if part invalidated
Sec. 2(d)–(f) · Government Power — Preserves other federal caller-ID/robocall/security/spectrum authorities; preempts inconsistent state law BUT expressly permits MORE restrictive state SIM-box laws; protects remainder of Act if part invalidated
Sec. 2(d)–(f) · Government Power — Preserves other federal caller-ID/robocall/security/spectrum authorities; preempts inconsistent state law BUT expressly permits MORE restrictive state SIM-box laws; protects remainder of Act if part invalidated
Findings source: bill-scores-v2-batch49-findings-2026-11-15.md. Highlights come only from that file; no finding, score, or provision was invented for this page.
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