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HR 10697 — No Troops in Our Streets Act of 2026
Freedom score: +2 (scale −10 to +10)
- Individual rights: +1
- Property rights: 0
- Economic freedom: 0
- Privacy & due process: +1
- Government power: 0
Sponsor: · Latest action: ()
Full text on GovInfo (introduced version) · Congress.gov · ← Bill Library index
Findings — 7 highlighted provisions
Each item below is one provision documented in the findings file. The same provision is highlighted in the full text underneath, with its section citation and criterion. Everything else on this page is plain, unreviewed bill text.
- Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(b)–(c)(1) · Individual Rights — Congress may end a statutory exception permitting military participation in domestic law enforcement by enacting a location-, activity-, and duration-specific joint resolution. This provides a congressional pathway for prohibiting an identified deployment; it does not itself immediately terminate any existing deployment. The ordinary joint-resolution enactment process, including presentment, still applies See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(b)–(c) · Individual Rights — The same disapproval process is extended to National Guard activations under 10 U.S.C. §12406; activation continues unless a disapproval is enacted See in text ↓
- Sec. 3(a)(1)–(3), (b) · Economic Freedom — Directly appropriates $600 million for Byrne JAG, $150 million for community violence intervention, $50 million for emergency law-enforcement assistance, and $100 million for COPS hiring; amounts remain available until spent. These are public law-enforcement expenditures, not industry-specific trade or price controls See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(b)–(c); Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(b) · Privacy and Due Process — Enacted deployment disapprovals can reduce exposure to domestic military policing and attendant searches and arrests. The procedure does not add a new individual warrant, hearing, or damages right See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(c)(2)–(4) · Government Power — Creates privileged congressional resolution introduction and consideration procedures, including rapid committee discharge, limits on debate and motions, handling of identical measures, and specific House/Senate rulemaking reservations See in text ↓
- Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(c)(5), (d); Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(d) · Government Power — Neither failure to introduce nor failure to enact a disapproval implies congressional intent; severability preserves the remainder if provisions are invalid See in text ↓
- Sec. 3(a)(3), (c)–(d) · Government Power — Emergency assistance requires State and local executive approval, and no more than $10 million may be directed per emergency by the President; new appropriations may not fund the assignment of federal personnel to localities, and are designated emergency requirements for budget enforcement. No new individual criminal penalty is established by this bill See in text ↓
Full text (introduced version)
25 of 26 text blocks highlighted. Source: GovInfo, fetched cached.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
SEC. 2. TERMINATION OF EXCEPTIONS AUTHORIZED TO PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF THE ARMY, NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AIR FORCE, AND SPACE FORCE AS POSSE COMITATUS.
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(b)–(c)(1) · Individual Rights — Congress may end a statutory exception permitting military participation in domestic law enforcement by enacting a location-, activity-, and duration-specific joint resolution. This provides a congressional pathway for prohibiting an identified deployment; it does not itself immediately terminate any existing deployment. The ordinary joint-resolution enactment process, including presentment, still applies
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(b)–(c); Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(b) · Privacy and Due Process — Enacted deployment disapprovals can reduce exposure to domestic military policing and attendant searches and arrests. The procedure does not add a new individual warrant, hearing, or damages right
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(c)(2)–(4) · Government Power — Creates privileged congressional resolution introduction and consideration procedures, including rapid committee discharge, limits on debate and motions, handling of identical measures, and specific House/Senate rulemaking reservations
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(c)(5), (d); Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(d) · Government Power — Neither failure to introduce nor failure to enact a disapproval implies congressional intent; severability preserves the remainder if provisions are invalid
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(b)–(c)(1) · Individual Rights — Congress may end a statutory exception permitting military participation in domestic law enforcement by enacting a location-, activity-, and duration-specific joint resolution. This provides a congressional pathway for prohibiting an identified deployment; it does not itself immediately terminate any existing deployment. The ordinary joint-resolution enactment process, including presentment, still applies
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(b)–(c); Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(b) · Privacy and Due Process — Enacted deployment disapprovals can reduce exposure to domestic military policing and attendant searches and arrests. The procedure does not add a new individual warrant, hearing, or damages right
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(c)(2)–(4) · Government Power — Creates privileged congressional resolution introduction and consideration procedures, including rapid committee discharge, limits on debate and motions, handling of identical measures, and specific House/Senate rulemaking reservations
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(c)(5), (d); Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(d) · Government Power — Neither failure to introduce nor failure to enact a disapproval implies congressional intent; severability preserves the remainder if provisions are invalid
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(b)–(c)(1) · Individual Rights — Congress may end a statutory exception permitting military participation in domestic law enforcement by enacting a location-, activity-, and duration-specific joint resolution. This provides a congressional pathway for prohibiting an identified deployment; it does not itself immediately terminate any existing deployment. The ordinary joint-resolution enactment process, including presentment, still applies
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(b)–(c); Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(b) · Privacy and Due Process — Enacted deployment disapprovals can reduce exposure to domestic military policing and attendant searches and arrests. The procedure does not add a new individual warrant, hearing, or damages right
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(c)(2)–(4) · Government Power — Creates privileged congressional resolution introduction and consideration procedures, including rapid committee discharge, limits on debate and motions, handling of identical measures, and specific House/Senate rulemaking reservations
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(c)(5), (d); Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(d) · Government Power — Neither failure to introduce nor failure to enact a disapproval implies congressional intent; severability preserves the remainder if provisions are invalid
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(b)–(c)(1) · Individual Rights — Congress may end a statutory exception permitting military participation in domestic law enforcement by enacting a location-, activity-, and duration-specific joint resolution. This provides a congressional pathway for prohibiting an identified deployment; it does not itself immediately terminate any existing deployment. The ordinary joint-resolution enactment process, including presentment, still applies
Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(b)–(c) · Individual Rights — The same disapproval process is extended to National Guard activations under 10 U.S.C. §12406; activation continues unless a disapproval is enacted
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(b)–(c); Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(b) · Privacy and Due Process — Enacted deployment disapprovals can reduce exposure to domestic military policing and attendant searches and arrests. The procedure does not add a new individual warrant, hearing, or damages right
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(b)–(c)(1) · Individual Rights — Congress may end a statutory exception permitting military participation in domestic law enforcement by enacting a location-, activity-, and duration-specific joint resolution. This provides a congressional pathway for prohibiting an identified deployment; it does not itself immediately terminate any existing deployment. The ordinary joint-resolution enactment process, including presentment, still applies
Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(b)–(c) · Individual Rights — The same disapproval process is extended to National Guard activations under 10 U.S.C. §12406; activation continues unless a disapproval is enacted
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(b)–(c); Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(b) · Privacy and Due Process — Enacted deployment disapprovals can reduce exposure to domestic military policing and attendant searches and arrests. The procedure does not add a new individual warrant, hearing, or damages right
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(c)(2)–(4) · Government Power — Creates privileged congressional resolution introduction and consideration procedures, including rapid committee discharge, limits on debate and motions, handling of identical measures, and specific House/Senate rulemaking reservations
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(c)(5), (d); Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(d) · Government Power — Neither failure to introduce nor failure to enact a disapproval implies congressional intent; severability preserves the remainder if provisions are invalid
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(b)–(c)(1) · Individual Rights — Congress may end a statutory exception permitting military participation in domestic law enforcement by enacting a location-, activity-, and duration-specific joint resolution. This provides a congressional pathway for prohibiting an identified deployment; it does not itself immediately terminate any existing deployment. The ordinary joint-resolution enactment process, including presentment, still applies
Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(b)–(c) · Individual Rights — The same disapproval process is extended to National Guard activations under 10 U.S.C. §12406; activation continues unless a disapproval is enacted
Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(b)–(c) · Individual Rights — The same disapproval process is extended to National Guard activations under 10 U.S.C. §12406; activation continues unless a disapproval is enacted
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(c)(2)–(4) · Government Power — Creates privileged congressional resolution introduction and consideration procedures, including rapid committee discharge, limits on debate and motions, handling of identical measures, and specific House/Senate rulemaking reservations
Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(b)–(c) · Individual Rights — The same disapproval process is extended to National Guard activations under 10 U.S.C. §12406; activation continues unless a disapproval is enacted
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(c)(2)–(4) · Government Power — Creates privileged congressional resolution introduction and consideration procedures, including rapid committee discharge, limits on debate and motions, handling of identical measures, and specific House/Senate rulemaking reservations
Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(b)–(c) · Individual Rights — The same disapproval process is extended to National Guard activations under 10 U.S.C. §12406; activation continues unless a disapproval is enacted
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(c)(2)–(4) · Government Power — Creates privileged congressional resolution introduction and consideration procedures, including rapid committee discharge, limits on debate and motions, handling of identical measures, and specific House/Senate rulemaking reservations
Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(b)–(c) · Individual Rights — The same disapproval process is extended to National Guard activations under 10 U.S.C. §12406; activation continues unless a disapproval is enacted
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(c)(5), (d); Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(d) · Government Power — Neither failure to introduce nor failure to enact a disapproval implies congressional intent; severability preserves the remainder if provisions are invalid
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(c)(5), (d); Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(d) · Government Power — Neither failure to introduce nor failure to enact a disapproval implies congressional intent; severability preserves the remainder if provisions are invalid
Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(b)–(c) · Individual Rights — The same disapproval process is extended to National Guard activations under 10 U.S.C. §12406; activation continues unless a disapproval is enacted
Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(b)–(c) · Individual Rights — The same disapproval process is extended to National Guard activations under 10 U.S.C. §12406; activation continues unless a disapproval is enacted
Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(b)–(c) · Individual Rights — The same disapproval process is extended to National Guard activations under 10 U.S.C. §12406; activation continues unless a disapproval is enacted
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(b)–(c)(1) · Individual Rights — Congress may end a statutory exception permitting military participation in domestic law enforcement by enacting a location-, activity-, and duration-specific joint resolution. This provides a congressional pathway for prohibiting an identified deployment; it does not itself immediately terminate any existing deployment. The ordinary joint-resolution enactment process, including presentment, still applies
Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(b)–(c) · Individual Rights — The same disapproval process is extended to National Guard activations under 10 U.S.C. §12406; activation continues unless a disapproval is enacted
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(b)–(c); Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(b) · Privacy and Due Process — Enacted deployment disapprovals can reduce exposure to domestic military policing and attendant searches and arrests. The procedure does not add a new individual warrant, hearing, or damages right
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(b)–(c)(1) · Individual Rights — Congress may end a statutory exception permitting military participation in domestic law enforcement by enacting a location-, activity-, and duration-specific joint resolution. This provides a congressional pathway for prohibiting an identified deployment; it does not itself immediately terminate any existing deployment. The ordinary joint-resolution enactment process, including presentment, still applies
Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(b)–(c) · Individual Rights — The same disapproval process is extended to National Guard activations under 10 U.S.C. §12406; activation continues unless a disapproval is enacted
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(b)–(c); Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(b) · Privacy and Due Process — Enacted deployment disapprovals can reduce exposure to domestic military policing and attendant searches and arrests. The procedure does not add a new individual warrant, hearing, or damages right
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(c)(2)–(4) · Government Power — Creates privileged congressional resolution introduction and consideration procedures, including rapid committee discharge, limits on debate and motions, handling of identical measures, and specific House/Senate rulemaking reservations
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(c)(5), (d); Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(d) · Government Power — Neither failure to introduce nor failure to enact a disapproval implies congressional intent; severability preserves the remainder if provisions are invalid
Sec. 2(a), new 18 U.S.C. §1385(c)(5), (d); Sec. 2(b), new 10 U.S.C. §12406(d) · Government Power — Neither failure to introduce nor failure to enact a disapproval implies congressional intent; severability preserves the remainder if provisions are invalid
SEC. 3. FUNDING FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT.
Sec. 3(a)(1)–(3), (b) · Economic Freedom — Directly appropriates $600 million for Byrne JAG, $150 million for community violence intervention, $50 million for emergency law-enforcement assistance, and $100 million for COPS hiring; amounts remain available until spent. These are public law-enforcement expenditures, not industry-specific trade or price controls
Sec. 3(a)(3), (c)–(d) · Government Power — Emergency assistance requires State and local executive approval, and no more than $10 million may be directed per emergency by the President; new appropriations may not fund the assignment of federal personnel to localities, and are designated emergency requirements for budget enforcement. No new individual criminal penalty is established by this bill
Sec. 3(a)(1)–(3), (b) · Economic Freedom — Directly appropriates $600 million for Byrne JAG, $150 million for community violence intervention, $50 million for emergency law-enforcement assistance, and $100 million for COPS hiring; amounts remain available until spent. These are public law-enforcement expenditures, not industry-specific trade or price controls
Sec. 3(a)(1)–(3), (b) · Economic Freedom — Directly appropriates $600 million for Byrne JAG, $150 million for community violence intervention, $50 million for emergency law-enforcement assistance, and $100 million for COPS hiring; amounts remain available until spent. These are public law-enforcement expenditures, not industry-specific trade or price controls
Sec. 3(a)(1)–(3), (b) · Economic Freedom — Directly appropriates $600 million for Byrne JAG, $150 million for community violence intervention, $50 million for emergency law-enforcement assistance, and $100 million for COPS hiring; amounts remain available until spent. These are public law-enforcement expenditures, not industry-specific trade or price controls
Sec. 3(a)(3), (c)–(d) · Government Power — Emergency assistance requires State and local executive approval, and no more than $10 million may be directed per emergency by the President; new appropriations may not fund the assignment of federal personnel to localities, and are designated emergency requirements for budget enforcement. No new individual criminal penalty is established by this bill
Sec. 3(a)(1)–(3), (b) · Economic Freedom — Directly appropriates $600 million for Byrne JAG, $150 million for community violence intervention, $50 million for emergency law-enforcement assistance, and $100 million for COPS hiring; amounts remain available until spent. These are public law-enforcement expenditures, not industry-specific trade or price controls
Sec. 3(a)(3), (c)–(d) · Government Power — Emergency assistance requires State and local executive approval, and no more than $10 million may be directed per emergency by the President; new appropriations may not fund the assignment of federal personnel to localities, and are designated emergency requirements for budget enforcement. No new individual criminal penalty is established by this bill
Sec. 3(a)(3), (c)–(d) · Government Power — Emergency assistance requires State and local executive approval, and no more than $10 million may be directed per emergency by the President; new appropriations may not fund the assignment of federal personnel to localities, and are designated emergency requirements for budget enforcement. No new individual criminal penalty is established by this bill
Sec. 3(a)(3), (c)–(d) · Government Power — Emergency assistance requires State and local executive approval, and no more than $10 million may be directed per emergency by the President; new appropriations may not fund the assignment of federal personnel to localities, and are designated emergency requirements for budget enforcement. No new individual criminal penalty is established by this bill
Findings source: bill-scores-v2-batch55-findings-2026-11-15.md. Highlights come only from that file; no finding, score, or provision was invented for this page.
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